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Abstract
What kind of knowledge can we obtain from agent-based models?
The claim that they help us to study the social world needs unpack-
ing. I will defend agent-based modelling against a recent criticisms
that undermine its potential as a method to investigate underlying
mechanisms and provide explanations of social phenomena. I show
that the criticism is unwarranted and the problem can be resolved
with an account of explanation that is associated with the social sci-
ences anyway, the mechanism account of explanation developed in
Machamer et al. (2000). I finish off discussing the mechanism account
with relation to prediction in agent-based modelling.
Introduction
Agent-based modelling (ABM hereafter) has, over the past three decades,
become a more and more influential method in the social sciences (Gilbert
(2008)) with applications in sociology (Macy and Sato (2002), Gilbert et al.
(2010), Hamill and Gilbert (2009)), criminology (van Baal (2004), van Baal
(2008)) and even some in economics (see Tesfatsion (2003) for an introduc-
tion, Gilbert et al. (2008) for an application and Buchanan (2009) for a
justification).
Given this growing interest in ABM it is important to assess the kind of
knowledge that can be obtained from ABM. Although there exists a body
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of literature on the epistemology of simulation (e.g. Humphreys (2002),
Humphreys and Bedau (2007), Humphreys (2009)), Winsberg (2003), Frigg
and Reiss (2009)) much of it is concerned with simulation in the natural sci-
ences, possibly stretching to economics but rarely to the less mathematical
of the social sciences.
Recently ABM has come under philosophical attack. Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009)
argues that ABM, against the claims of modellers, is not able to provide
causal explanations of social phenomena. Using a prominent example of
an artificial society, (Dean et al. (1999)) he intends to show up a host of
problems that beset ABM. His main argument is that ABM can only ever
provide partial explanations. As causal explanations have to be complete, i.e.
tell the ‘whole’ causal story, no ABM is able to provide causal explanations.
He uses an account of a functional explanation from Cummins (1975) to
provide a positive account of what kind of explanation can be provided by
an ABM.
In this article I will show that Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s argument is flawed in sev-
eral ways. The problem of partial explanations and all the ensuing prob-
lems discussed below are problems of ABM hold for at least all of the social
sciences. Gru¨ne-Yanoff proposes an alternative kind of explanation, a func-
tional explanation, which is a epistemically second class. A relatively recent
account of explanation, the mechanism account (cf. Machamer et al. (2000)),
resolves the problem of causal explanations having to be complete elegantly.
After showing that Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s position is unneccessary I use the mecha-
nism account of explanation to resolve another recent debate on explanation
and prediction in ABM (cf. Epstein (2008), Thompson and Derr (2009),
Troitzsch (2009)).
1 The Goal of the Social Sciences
Before heading into the question of what kind of explanation we can expect
from ABM I want to briefly discuss different kinds of explanation in general
and kinds of explanation in the social sciences.
1.1 What kind of Explanation?
The starting point of a proper philosophy of explanation is often put in the
1940 with Hempel and Oppenheim’s account of the covering law model of
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explanation, cf. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). It is the creation of a logic
of explanation, defining an explanation as a deduction of the explanandum
from a set of general laws and initial conditions. Importantly, the covering
law model sees explanation and prediction as symmetric concepts. For in-
deterministic events the inductive-statistical model of explanation is invoked
where the explanandum is rendered highly likely as a conclusion of the gen-
eral laws plus initial conditions. There are many objections to this model
of explanation, e.g. purely formal nature of the account, asking questions
of relevance and meaning, i.e. one might be able to deduce an explanan-
dum from a set of premises without it constituting an explanation. Another
widespread attack is the symmetry thesis of the account that sees explana-
tion and prediction as having the same formal structure, the only difference
being their temporal orientation.1
Since the 1940s there has been a proliferation of models of explanation,
e.g. the pragmatic account developed in van Fraassen (1980) or accounts of
explanation as serving understanding (cf. de Regt (2009)). In the follow-
ing discussion I limit myself accounts that allow for a realist ontology as we
only need to consider accounts stronger in terms of realism than the func-
tional explanation account proposed in Cummins (1975). Realist accounts of
explanation can be roughly classified as the following (cf. Douglas (2009)).
1. Covering Law Explanations: the deduction of the explanans from gen-
eral laws and initial conditions, cf. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948).
Example: explaining the trajectory of a projectile using Newtonian
physics.
2. Causal Explanations: relaying a step-by-step account of how an event
came about, identifying all relevant facts pertaining to the event, cf.
Salmon (1998). Example: explaining the occurrence of a car accident.
3. Mechanistic Explanations: a kind of causal explanation where no full
causal story can be told. Entities and their causal connections are
identified to give an explanatory account of phenomena, cf. Machamer
et al. (2000). Example: explaining the recent financial crisis by sub-
prime mortgage lending.
4. Unifying Explanations: to show that the explanans falls under a general
theory that explains many similar phenomena, cf. Kitcher (1976). Ex-
1For further discussion of criticisms see Salmon (1990)
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ample: evolutionary explanations of explananda such as the peacock’s
tail and the human brain.
The general law in the covering law account of explanation has the func-
tion to make the link between one state (the initial conditions) (S1) to another
state, the explanandum(S2). The law ‘covers’ the transition between S1 and
S2. If we take the covering law approach as the starting point of a theory
of scientific explanation the other three can be related to it as relaxing the
general law requirement.
In the case of causal and mechanistic explanations, the relaxation happens
by no longer using a general law to justify the transition from S1 to S2 but by
proposing a direct causal connection between S1 and S2. For the traditional
causal explanation a full causal story of an event has to be given, i.e. S1 must
lead to S
n
via s2. . . sn−1. In a mechanistic explanation the causal powers
are proposed to be directly connected to the entities involved in the event
(e.g. via capacities or activities). No full causal story needs to be told but
the entities must be shown to be at work. Unifying explanations relax the
lawlikeness of the theoretical cover by replacing it by a general theory linking
S1 and S2.
As stated above, decades of criticism have rendered the covering law
model of explanation a nice idea without much application. Most sciences do
not have the laws of nature necessary to obtain an explanation and prediction
symmetry. The main problem with the causal model of explanation is how
to actually distinguish a causal process from any other correlation process
in particular in complex systems. The problems of explanatory relevance
and explanatory asymmetries2 are a result of an impoverished ontology of
an account of causation which shies away from attributing causal powers
to entities and tries to cover causal connections by regularities. I discuss
mechanism explanations in the next section as the most appropriate kind
of explanation for the social sciences. The unification theory of explanation
is a useful theory in some contexts but has the problem of generality of an
explanation leading to irrelevance, cf. Lipton (2004). Let us now look at
explanation in the social sciences.
2For explanatory relevance consider the explanation of birth control pills ‘preventing’
pregnancies in men, for explanatory asymmetry imagine a flagpole of hight h with a shadow
of length l; h can explain l but it makes no sense to explain the hight of the flagpole by
its shadow (both examples are from Salmon (1990))
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1.2 What kind of Explanation for the Social Sciences?
There are different conceptions of the ontology and epistemology of the social
world. One such conception is that of analytic sociology in which the focus
is on mechanisms underlying social phenomena and the social sciences is
the investigation into those mechanisms, cf. Elster (1989). The mechanism
approach is in opposition both to hermeneutic approaches, which claim that
the social world cannot be explained but only interpreted and to statistical
explanations based on the covering law approach resulting discussed above.3
Seeing the social sciences as concerned with mechanisms means to not allow
“black-box explanations” such as statistical correlations. Although statistical
correlations can be used as evidence for causal associations, they are not an
explanation in themselves as they do not lay open the “cogs and wheels”
operating to produce the phenomenon in question.
There are several different definitions of what mechanisms are (for a recent
review see Hedstro¨m and Ylikoski (2010)). A mechanism approach neither
reduces social entities to physical entities nor sees social mechanisms as the
same as physical mechanisms. Hedstro¨m and Ylikoski state that an adequate
account of mechanisms in the social sciences needs a proper theory of action.
The authors argue that a mechanism based social science, although often as-
sociated with rational choice, is in fact a step away from the empirically false
assumptions of that theory. In order to uncover mechanisms it is not enough
to “save the phenomena” (Duhem (1954)) but assumptions need to have em-
pirical foundation. On the other hand, mechanism based approaches can be
very abstract and start from very simple assumptions and specifications.
The assumptions of a mechanism view of the social world can be sum-
marised as:
1. causality is more than mere regularity,
2. there are entities at work producing social phenomena and
3. we can identify these entities and their interactions and thus find the
mechanisms underlying social processes.
An account of mechanism explanations can be found in Machamer et al.
(2000). A further account on causal explanations in the social sciences is
developed in Yilkoski (2001).
3See Hempel (1965) for the inductive-statistical explanation.
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2 Functional Capacities or Causal Explana-
tions?
In this section I look at a recent publication highly critical of ABM. Gru¨ne-
Yanoff (2009) argues that ABM has been misconstrued by modellers as ex-
plaining causal histories of social phenomena. He uses the Anazasi model
from Dean et al. (1999) and Axtell et al. (2002) for his discussion. The
model describes the population dynamics in the Long House Valley, Arizona.
The Anazasi are a population that inhabited the Long House Valley, starting
slowly from the introduction of a maize production in BC 1800 until AD1300
at which point there was a sudden and complete population exodus from the
area. The landscape of the area is reconstructed in the model, using paleo-
geographical data. The agents in this model are households. The agents are
defined by attributes like Maize consumption, Maize production, storage etc.
There are two reasons for households to move: marriage (household fission)
and insufficient harvest (household relocation). Using a host of other paleo-
environmental data, the population dynamics are modeled for the timespan
between AD 800-1300, a period, which is relatively data-rich, relatively in
terms of archeology. Runs of the model give outputs of dynamics that are
very close to the historic dynamics curve. The total exodus is not replicated
in any run, however. The authors conclude that
“To “explain” an observed spatio-temporal history is to specify
agents that generate or grow this history. By this criterion,
our strictly environmental account of the evolution of this soci-
ety during this period goes a long way towards explaining this
history.” (Epstein and Axtell, 1996, p.7278)
Gru¨ne-Yanoff argues that this simulation does not give a causal explana-
tion of the population dynamics of the Anazasi. The argument is not that the
simulation is not an explanation of the Anazasi population but that it is not
a causal explanation. The simulation does not tell a full causal history of the
population dynamics, for example, the total exodus is not an outcome of any
run of the simulation thus leaving the explanation partial. Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s
argues that there is no such thing as a partial causal explanation. A causal
explanation has to give an account of the complete interactions leading to a
natural phenomenon as there is no formal criterion to distinguish good causal
explanations. As we have seen above, a causal explanation indeed needs to
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provide a full causal history as it cannot rely on any overarching theory
to cover connections between events. We discuss Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s criticism
one by one in the following subsections showing that they are not problems
unique to ABM.
Gru¨ne-Yanoff goes on to discuss what kind of explanation ABM can pro-
vide, concluding that the most appropriate theory of explanation for ABM
is that of a functional explanation from Cummins (1975). In the following
sections I discuss Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s arguments why ABM can only provide par-
tial explanations to then discuss in more detail the functional explanation
account and how it solves the explanatory problem of ABM.
Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s position has been challenged elsewhere on other accounts
(cf. Chattoe-Brown and Elsenbroich (2011)) so here we only discuss those
points relevant for the discussion of the explanatory power of ABM.
2.1 Data-problems
Gru¨ne-Yanoff identifies two problems concerning the data resulting in the
Anazasi Simulation merely being a partial explanation. The first problem
has to do with the input data. In a simulation of a car in a carcrash we
obtain a result exemplifying a causal explanation (e.g. why the windscreen
smashed). In order to simulate the car and the crash we have full information
of the material and structure of the car. We also know all the causal laws
at work in a crash situation and know how the constituent parts interact. In
the case of the Anazasi simulation we do not know all the micro-mechanisms
at work, i.e. the behavioural rules of the agents etc. nor do we have any
overarching laws. Thus, we will not have a full explanation of any macro-
phenomenon. The second problem resides with the output data. The sim-
ulation of the Anazasi replicates the population dynamics curve quite well.
Both the closest run, presented in (Axtell et al., 2002, p. 278), and the av-
erage run taken from about 15 replications show a very close fit. However,
no run has ever replicated the complete exodus of the population in 1300.
Thus, the explanation cannot be a complete explanation, as at least one real
life phenomenon is not explained by it. There are two problems with this
analysis:
1. The car crash simulation is not intended to give an explanation but
intended to test whether the car is safe. The Anazasi simulation is in-
tended to replicate a set of output data by making a set of assumptions.
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Gru¨ne-Yanoffs account makes any abductive inference from simulation
impossible. It also makes abductive inference for a causal explana-
tion impossible. At any point where a competing explanation exists,
Gru¨ne-Yanoffs account necessarily reduces the explanations to a func-
tional explanation and ergo it makes causal explanation impossible in
the social sciences. This is not a problem of ABM but of social science
as a whole.
2. That the input data is unreliable is a feature of the social sciences,
not of the methodology of simulation. It is almost common sense that
a model based on archeological data will be missing some factors. In
addition, in the social sciences in general we cannot isolate experimen-
tally micro-level factors. Any data in the social sciences will be partial,
possibly unreliable, and full of problems endemic to the social sciences
as a whole. Insisting on complete knowledge of micro-phenomena for
a causal explanation makes causal explanation impossible in the social
sciences. This is also not a problem of ABM but of social science as a
whole.
What Gru¨ne-Yanoff identifies as data problems of ABM are simply data
problems of the social sciences. It is not impossible to defend a position in
which the social sciences do not aim to find causal laws (e.g. interpretative
and descriptive approaches, see for example Rabinow and Sullivan (1979))
but from such a position it makes no sense to attack ABM to not come up
with the goods as there is no goods to come up with.
2.2 Falsifying and Curve Fitting
The Anazasi model is compared to a climate model, discussed in Ku¨ppers
and Lenhard (2005). Initially the climate model was run based on simple
equations, known to be true about the system; it ‘exploded’ after a short
run. The simulators then deliberately added some false assumptions, e.g.
that the kinetic energy in the atmosphere remains constant. By adding this
assumption the system ran smoothly and gave appropriate retrodiction of
climate data, similar to what the Anazasi simulation does. Gru¨ne-Yanoff
states that a simulation with false assumptions cannot enhance our causal
understanding of the world but it is still useful as it helps us to understand
processes functionally.
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Similar to the above, the climate simulation and the Anazasi simulation
are inherently different. Both simulations retrodict data but for different
purposes. Whilst Axtell et. al. are interested in seeing in how far data
available on environmental factors can explain the population dynamics in
the Long Valley, the climate simulation uses the retrodiction as a proxy for
the capacity of the simulation to predict. The falsification in the climate
simulation is used to make the simulation run in the first place and to fit the
data. No conscious falsification has been performed in the Anazasi model to
fit the historic data curve. The assumptions in the model might be incomplete
but they have not been falsified to fit the model to the data.
2.3 Level-Distinctions
The final argument against ABMs resulting in causal explanations is about
levels of explanation. Towards the end of the paper Gru¨ne-Yanoff makes a
distinction between functional and causal explanations involving different lev-
els of phenomena. Functional explanations use constituent capacities (lower
level) to explain system capacities (higher level). Causal explanations, in
comparison, need to explain phenomena on the same level. For the Anazasi
simulation Gru¨ne-Yanoff states that a dispersion (explanandum) is supposed
to be explained by the individual movings (explanans) but then he identifies
them meaning they cannot be on a different level.
“The dispersion is nothing but the individual movings.” (Gru¨ne-
Yanoff, 2009, p. 552)
Although it can be argued that a dispersion is not just the individual
movings as it is a coordinated movement, the following example exemplifies
a clearer case of micro and macro levels. Let us have a look at a well known
agent-based model, the Schelling Model from Schelling (1971). Schelling won-
dered about the phenomenon of segregation in American cities. To explore
the phenomenon he devised a simple model. Imagine a grid with agents ran-
domly allocate to the patches on the grid. The agents come in two colours, red
and green. Agents have a threshold for how many agents of the other colour
they tolerate in their neighbourhood. If the number of other coloured agents
exceeds that threshold, the agent moves to an arbitrary other patch on the
grid. Schelling initially executed this set of agent interactions on a checkered
board by hand. He found that clustering of colours and hence segregation
resulted even with agents having rather weak preferences for similarity.
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Clustering/segregation comes about due to the movements of agents ac-
cording to their preferences. Here the thresholds cause agents to move (same
(micro) level) the movings according to those preferences cause cluster-
ing/segregation (higher (macro) level). It is only a partial explanation of
the real world phenomenon as no real world segregation is simply caused by
the preference relation; many other variable play into real segregation. But
would we say that the segregation is nothing but the individual movings?
There seems to be a more interesting process explored in this simulation
experiment.
2.4 Limit-Problems
Gru¨ne-Yanoff states that a full functional explanation is a causal explanation.
This uniqueness is explicitly used in Cumins Individuation criterion (below).
The problem is that we will never have a causal explanation as we can never
really be sure we have identified all the real entities and mechanisms at
work. The theory of functional explanation does not allow a part causal part
functional explanation with the possibility of an increasing causal part in the
face of additional information. It also does not allow for isolating causes for
phenomena. This would mean that the Shelling model of segregation is not
a causal explanation of segregation at all. It is clear that the Shelling model
does not tell the whole story of segregation but it shows that segregation can
be caused by the possibility of movement at very low “tolerance” thresholds.
2.5 Functional explanation
So Gru¨ne-Yanoff is right in his assessment that ABM does not provide full
causal histories and thus cannot provide causal explanations. He goes on to
discuss an account of explanation allowing ABM to save (explanatory) face. I
discuss the account below and argue that the account, rather than providing
a second class explanation, as is suggested in Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009), coincides
exactly with the explanatory account devised instead of a strict causal ac-
count for complex phenomena, the mechanism account (cf. Machamer et al.
(2000)).
According to Cummins (1975) the explanandum in a functional explana-
tion is a system S ψ-ing, i.e. displaying the capacity ψ. The explanans of a
functional explanation has three parts:
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i) An analytic account A of a system S ψ-ing which contains
ii) The description of a component x ϕ-ing and
iii) The claim that x indeed can ϕ.
The advantage of this functional explanation using the notion of capacity
rather than causes as a potential or possible explanation it threefold:
1. Individuation according to possible functions rather than factors or
mechanisms. Why this is important seems to be a difference in speci-
ficity, i.e. a factor or mechanism is a unique instantiation whereas a
function can have multiple instantiations. So, we find out something
like there is something that performs some dampening without knowing
exactly what entity or collection of entities produces the effect.
2. Transferability across different causal structures. Gru¨ne-Yanoff uses
the example of the Ising Model of statistical mechanics. The model
can be applied to ferromagnets as well as to market dynamics. The
only way the same model can be applied to the two systems which
clearly do not share a set of entities is that they have something else in
common, something like structure, here called functional organisation.
Functional organisation ‘can be analysed with the same model and this
model may improve our understanding of how each system acquires the
capacities it has through the interactions of its subsystem.’ (Gru¨ne-
Yanoff, 2009, p.xx)
3. Level-distinction in functional analysis means that the analysis shows
how lower level capacities constitute higher-level capacities. The dif-
ferentiation is between constitutive relationships at different levels in a
functional explanation and causal relationships at the same level. (See
Section 2.3 above.)
First of all I think the terminology of the above rather unfortunate. A
functional explanation as commonly used in the social sciences (e.g. struc-
tural functionalism) is ontological and a sui generis feature of the social
world. There are plenty of problems besetting functional explanations, among
them their teleological nature and their ascription of intentions non-intentional
entities. Although feathered wings help birds to fly, wings did not (over
time) become feathered to enable birds to fly. In the social sciences there are
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many functional explanations of this kind in which phenomena are explained
by their ‘benefit to society’ (e.g. Parsons’ Structural Functionalism). For
an account of the sui generis kind of functional explanation and ABM see
Chattoe-Brown (2006).
The notion of functional explanation above is epistemological in the sense
that we can find out the functions of different parts within a system. It is a
partial causal explanation viable only as an interim solution whilst we do not
know better given that partial causal explanations are impossible as there
are no quality criteria for partial causal explanation. The quality of a causal
explanation can only be assessed by knowing all the causal steps. Thus a
functional explanation a la Cummins is a second class explanation.
Secondly, and more importantly, this capacity account of explanation
can be mapped one to one to the mechanism account of explanation advo-
cated in Machamer et al. (2000) as a causal explanation for complex systems.
Machamer et. al. propose that the ontology of causality as regularities makes
capturing causal processes in complex systems impossible. Instead they pro-
pose an ontology that involves entities and activities. In the above account, x
is an entity in the system S that displays the activity of ϕ-ing leading to the
system S ψ-ing. Committing to an ontology of causal capacities of entities
or causal activities of entities, Cummin’s account of functional explanation
becomes a mechanism explanation a la Machamer et. al. This means it is
not a second class explanation at all but a causal explanation in an ontol-
ogy that sees causality as more than mere regularity and the kind of causal
explanation advocated for complex systems of which society can be seen as
an example. Thus again, the partial nature of explanations in ABM is not
unique to ABM but a feature of the social sciences.
Furthermore, the problem of partial causal explanations in the social
sciences is well known resulting in varied proposals of accounts of explana-
tions. Some of these accounts eliminate a realist ontology altogether, like
van Fraassen’s pragmatist account (cf. van Fraassen (1980)) or de Regt’s
account of explanation as understanding (cf. de Regt (2009)). We opted for
an account that preserves a realist ontology but is also adequate for systems
such as social systems, the mechanism account of explanation (cf. Machamer
et al. (2000)) because it is a) it renders explanations from ABM causal rather
than the second class functional explanations proposed by Gru¨ne-Yanoff, b)
it fits in with a coherent interpretation of the social sciences as uncovering
mechanisms underlying social phenomena c) this interpretation of social sci-
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ence is closest as an aim to the methodology of ABM and finally, d) the
account of mechanism explanations helps to resolve another epistemologi-
cal/methodological debate in ABM, the problem of explanatory power with
limited predictive power.
3 Predictions and Explanations
In this section I discuss the problem of prediction in ABM. In the first princi-
pled study of explanations in the philosophy of science, explanation and pre-
diction were inextricably linked (Hempel and Oppenheim (1948)). This link
is a logical equivalence between prediction and explanation called the symme-
try thesis stating that the logical structure of both explanation and prediction
is the same and the only difference the temporal orientation (prediciton is
future oriented whereas explanation is about the past). Essentially, if we can
predict a phenomenon to occur, we know what brings it about and thus have
explained it. As discussed above, this equivalence resulted from a specific
model of explanations, the covering law model. In the covering law model,
an explanation is a deduction of the explanans from a (set of) general law(s)
plus initial conditions.
Prediction is a thorn in the side of ABM. Models claim to replicate pro-
cesses of the real world but no detailed prediction has ever been derived from
an ABM.4
One important reason why ABM are expected to predict is that tradi-
tionally, prediction is what simulations are for. Two examples of simulations
were discussed in an earlier section, the crash-test car simulation and the
climate model.
The car-crash simulation is devised solely to simulate the exact procedure
of the car crash, thus predicting the exact impact of the crash on the car. Its
purpose is to predict so that the real world car can be improved. This pre-
dictive power is achieved by the full knowledge of the causal interconnections
of the car (of its structure, its materials, etc.).
The climate model also started off as a truthful mechanistic system. The
initial programming was according to the laws supposedly underlying the sys-
4In April 2009 Scott Moss asked SimSoc whether there as ever been an ABM making
a successful prediction of a policy implmentation. The answer was negative, leading to a
discussion on the same list headed ‘What’s the point?’.
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tem. The simulation ‘exploded’, rendering the truthful representation useless
for prediction. Some falsifying assumptions were made until finally the sim-
ulation retrodicted historic data adequately. The reason for the simulation
is to predict the future climate development. Given the falsified assumptions
we do not believe this prediction due to the exact replication of the processes
in the climate system as was the case in the crash test dummy example.
Here we believe the prediction because of the fit of historic data, its success-
ful retrodiction. We could call this an inductive prediction. The difference
between inductive and causal prediction is well made in Troitzsch (2009).
Since the identification of prediction and explanation has long been de-
bated (see e.g. Rescher (1957)) resulting in a proliferation of explanatory
models divorced from prediction. Explanation learned to stand on its own
as the goal of science with prediction relegated to the fringes.
Causal, mechanistic and unifying explanations have been divorced from
prediction by their singularity (causality), their complexity (mechanism) and
their generality (unification). But can an explanation really be explanatory
without allowing prediction?
In a recent discussion on the epistemology of ABM Epstein (2008) delib-
erately cuts the cord between prediction and explanation, saying that there
are many other reasons to model. He is certainly right in saying that pre-
diction is not the sole justification of a model, in particular prediction as
commonly defined in the natural sciences, i.e. predicting at a pretty detailed
level what happens to a system or parts of a system in the future. Against
this rather defensive position, Thompson and Derr (2009) argue that expla-
nation and prediction must not and need not be divorced, only the notion
of prediction needs to be widened to include more general predictions, such
as “earthquakes happen” as a prediction of tectonic plate theory. Troitzsch
(2009) makes an important distinction between three levels of specificity of
predictions. He also distinguishes between stochastic and deterministic pre-
dictions. His solution to the debate on prediction and explanation is that
any good explanation will yield at least a prediction of type one:
“Which kinds of behaviour can be expected [from a system like
this] under arbitrarily given parameter combinations and initial
conditions?” (Troitzsch, 2009, 1.1)
Sometimes it will even yield an explanation of type two:
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“Which kind of behaviour will a given target system (whose pa-
rameters and previous states may or may not have been precisely
measured) display in the near future?” (Troitzsch, 2009, 1.1)
It is, however, not necessary for an explanation to provide a prediction
of type three:
“Which state will the target system reach in the near future,
again given parameters and previous states which may or may
not have been precisely measured?” (Troitzsch, 2009, 1.1)
Troitzschs reply to Thompson and Derr’s weakening of the notion of pre-
diction to the prediction “earthquakes occur” from plate techtonics, is that
humanity will know that fact after experiencing the first earthquake without
needing any theory at all.
For Troitzsch the problem of prediction and explanation is a purely epis-
temic one of not knowing the initial conditions of a system well enough to
warrant prediction. Troitzsch concludes that the symmetry thesis of expla-
nation and prediction is alive and well “from a logical point of view but not
from a practical point of view” (Troitzsch, 2009, 1.6). But is this really all
there is to it?
The interpretation of the symmetry thesis dividing the logical and epis-
temic level states that explanations and predictions are are logically the same
but due to a lack of knowledge of initial conditions we might have non-
predictive explanations. It does not answer the problem of non-explanatory
predictions.
Let us take the climate simulation from Ku¨ppers and Lenhard (2005)
again. The processes in the simulation were deliberately falsified. The simu-
lation retrodicts climate data well and we infer from this capacity to retrodict
the capacity to provide prediction of type 2 above. But is this kind of pre-
diction explanatory?
Let us imagine a scenario: There is a competition to draw an imaginary
climate curve up to the timespan between 2000 BC to 3000 AD. Let us
presume we match the curves to the real data and then select the one that
is the closest fit in terms of retrodiction. Would we be in any way justified
to presume that the future prediction is true? We clearly would not. Does it
mean that it is necessarily false? Certainly not, but a match would be pure
luck (or some supernatural clairvoyance on the part of the curve maker).
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We might have prediction without the underlying mechanism but no reason
to believe it is true. We certainly do not have an explanation of climate
development.
The problem of non-explanatory predictions has been discussed widely
in the philosophical literature. In Salmon (1978)’s “Why ask, ‘Why?’?”,
Salmon argues that if we had all the information in a deterministic world and
would be able to exactly predict any future states of the world, we would still
want more, we would still want an answer to a Why-question. The reason
why we would still want this answer is that we would want knowledge of the
underlying mechanisms bringing about the future states.
Although it is questionable whether we would really still want answers
to Why-questions if we were able to predict everything perfectly, in a world
where we can not predict everything perfectly, answers to Why-questions
providing knowledge of the underlying mechanisms because it helps us to
predict some bits of the world a little bit better. Douglas (2009) argues along
those lines that the symmetry thesis does not give an adequate account of
explanation but neither does any account leaving out prediction altogether.
For her explanations are tools to help us generate predictions about the world
by providing conceptualisations of the world.
“Explanations help us to organize the complex world we en-
counter, making it cognitively manageable (which may be why
they also give us a sense of understanding).” (Douglas, 2009, p.
454)
This cognitive account of explanation and prediction together with Troitzsch’s
different layers of system state prediction can give us a handle on ABM.
Let us look at an example. In Gilbert et al. (2008) an agent based model
of the English housing market is developed. In this model there are agents
acting as buyers, sellers and realtors (estate agents) according to different
goals and intentions, leading to different roles in the market interactions. The
environment is a grid with houses of initially random values. The agents also
have different incomes and savings and are on different steps of the housing
ladder (e.g. first time buyers). The model also implements a host of economic
variables, such as interest rates, inflation, Gini index etc. One of the most
interesting outcomes of the model is that the level of interest rates has much
less influence on house prices than the number of first time buyers entering
the market. The model was published in 2008 and shortly afterwards the
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banking crisis was followed by a (slight) housing crash. And the lack of
first time buyers contributed to this crash as banks suddenly wanted a large
deposit for mortgages, at least for mortgages at a reasonable interest rate,
resulting in many people no longer being able to afford to enter the market as
first time buyers leading to many properties staying on the market for a long
time until the sellers reduced the price. The model of the housing market
did not predict a housing market crash due to a lack of first time buyers but
it helps to investigate the influence of different parameters, such as interest
rates, first time buyers, etc. on house prices.
Mechanism explanations give us an account of how a system works, a
set of patterns in particular contexts. By invoking the entities and activities
at work, we can work out what will happen in similar contexts containing
such entities and activities. They help us to generate predictions which
can be tested in experimental settings and, if the predictions are false the
mechanism framework requires one to figure out which mechanism was at
fault (cf. Douglas (2009) for a discussion on mechanism explanations and
prediction).
4 Conclusion
In this article I have argued against a criticism recently launched at ABM of
not being able to provide causal explanations in Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009). My
main arguments against his position are that his criticisms are not specific
to ABM but beset the whole of the social sciences and that his account of
explanation he sees as appropriate for ABM is not the second rate explana-
tion he makes it out to be but indeed the appropriate account when used in
a sensible ontology for the social sciences. As a result ABM are a method-
ology providing mechanism explanations, a kind of causal explanations for
the social sciences (cf. Machamer et al. (2000)). I have further argued for
mechanism explanations resolving the problem of prediction and explanation
(cf. Epstein (2008), Thompson and Derr (2009), Troitzsch (2009)).
Not all problems are solved by ABM providing mechanism explanations.
The ontology of entities and activities proposed in Machamer et al. (2000) is
by no means uncontroversial. A smaller ontology of entities and capacities
(advocated for example by Cartwritght (1989)) is often preferred to the dou-
ble commitment above. Although the ontological question is important for
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the philosophy of science, the account of mechanism explanations can stand
without its resolution. Whether activities have ontic status or whether they
are outcomes of capacities, they can feature in an explanation of a complex
phenomenon.
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